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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2009-10 Term at the Supreme Court was a relatively quiet one for
labor and employment law. Actually, shockingly quiet. In a Term that
included major rulings on gun rights and money in politics,' a Term that
marked the first year on the Court for Justice Sonia Sotomayor and the last
year for Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court's work-related docket grabbed
no headlines.
There were a few cases that looked like they might change the
landscape. Ontario v. Quon2 - which considered the scope of a government
employee's reasonable privacy expectations in a pager provided by his
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. Many thanks to Ann
Hodges, Marcia McCormick and the editors for their helpful comments and hard work.
1. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
2. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
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employer - could have been a significant decision for employee privacy
rights in the digital age. But it wasn't. Lewis v. City of Chicago3 - which
addressed the limitations period for disparate impact discrimination claims
- could have given Justice Antonin Scalia the opportunity to further opine
on the constitutionality of Title VII's disparate impact provisions.4 But it
didn't. In New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board, the
Court did hold that the two-member Board that issued hundreds of
decisions during 2008 and 2009 lacked the authority to issue those
decisions. But even that case has caused relatively little disruption.
Of the remaining work-law cases that came to the Court, two resolved
disputes over decisionmaking authority in interpretation of arbitration
agreements,6 and two involved correct interpretation of the Employee
Retirement Investment Security Act (ERISA).7 These cases did not
significantly alter the law. As the following discussion of the cases reflects,
about half of the decisions were unanimous or close to it, and about half
split the Court. The collection of cases did not suggest a very clear pattern
or trend in the Court's theoretical direction. As has been true throughout
Chief Justice John Roberts' tenure, the decisions overall reflect a powerful
deference to business interests.
II. NEW PROCESS TEEL
In New Process Steel, L.P. v. National Labor Relations Board, a
divided Court held that two members do not constitute a quorum of the
National Labor Relations Board (Board) with authority to exercise the
delegated authority of the full Board.8 The decision calls into some
question nearly 600 Board opinions reached between January 1, 2008 and
March 21, 2010. And yet, while the decision could have theoretically been
enormously disruptive, its practical consequences have not been so drastic.
The National Labor Relations Act provides that:
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more
3. 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
4. In Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), Justice Scalia concurred separately to suggest
that the constitutionality of disparate impact law was an issue the Court would have to confront in the
future.
5. New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
6. Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010); Rent-A-Center, West,
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010). A third case, Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng'rs, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2010), resulted in a brief, unanimous interpretation of the Railway Labor Act's
arbitration requirements.
7. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010); Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S.
Ct. 1640 (2010).
8. 130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010).
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members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise . . . . A
vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members
to exercise all of the powers of the Board, and three members of the
Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except that
two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant
to the first sentence hereof.9
The dispute in New Process Steel involved an interpretation of this text.
In 2007, the Board included only four sitting members. One seat was
vacant, and two of the sitting members were on recess appointments that
would expire at the end of the year.'o Just before the end of 2007, the four
Board members delegated all of the Board's powers to a three-member
subset of the group." This decision was taken expressly to preserve the
Board's authority to function, even when only two members remained. The
Board reasoned that 1) National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) section 3(b)
expressly says that the Board can delegate all of its powers to a three-
member subset,12 and 2) a majority of the authority-holding Board can
constitute a quorum.1 Thus, if three Board members held the delegated
authority of the full Board, then when only two Board members remained,
those two members would constitute a quorum and could continue to do the
work of the Board while waiting for appointment of new members.
For twenty-seven months, until March 27, 2010, this two-member
"quorum" operated as the Board, deciding almost 600 cases, including one
that sustained unfair labor practice complaints against New Process Steel.14
New Process challenged the Board's authority to act with only two
members. The Seventh Circuit upheld the two-member Board's authority,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split in the circuits
over the authority of a two-member Board to issue binding decisions.5
The Court, in a five to four decision authored by Justice Stevens,
reversed the Seventh Circuit, concluding that the Board must include at
least three members to exercise authority. The Court reasoned that the best
reading of the Act's somewhat confusing language is that a "group" to
which the full Board delegates authority must maintain a membership of
three for the delegation to remain valid. Thus, two members can operate as
a quorum of a Board that actually still has three members - for example if
9. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b).
10. New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2638.
11. Id.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(b) (2006).
13. New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2638-39.
14. Id. at 2639.
15. Id.
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one member is ill, or must recuse himself from a particular decision. As
soon as the number of Board members drops below three, this quorum
provision is no longer applicable, however, because the two members are
no longer part of "a group of three or more members" as required by the
first sentence of the section. The majority found that this reading gives
effect to all of the statutory language, while alternative readings make some
of the language redundant or nonsensical.16
Justice Stevens' majority opinion supplemented this reading of the
section's text with the observation that when Congress amended the statute
in 1947, it specifically increased the Board quorum from two to three
members.17 To permit an interpretation of the language that rests Board
authority in two members, reasoned the Court, would be entirely
inconsistent with this legislative intent.18 Moreover, the possibility that a
two-member Board could exercise Board authority indefinitely under the
interpretation urged by the government and favored by the dissent troubled
the majority deeply.
Justice Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor.'9 The four dissenters observed
that the NLRA is supposed to ensure efficient resolution of labor
disputes.That purpose is better served, they argued, by interpreting section
3(b) to permit a two member quorum of a properly designated three
member group to exercise Board authority.20 The dissent noted that nothing
in the NLRA suggests that a delegation of power to three Board members
expires when one of those three Board members holding delegated
authority leaves the Board.2' In fact, the dissent argued, the majority's
reading of the Act did quite the opposite of harmonizing all of the statute's
language. Instead, the requirement that the Board include three members
for a two-member quorum to have authority ignored the "vacancy" clause
of section 3(b) entirely. That provision states that "a vacancy in the Board
shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the
powers of the Board."22 Taking a very different view of legislative intent
than that of the majority, the dissenting opinion focused on Congress'
16. New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2640-4 1.
17. Id. at 2638.
18. Id at 2644.
19. Id. at 2645 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
20. Id (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 2646 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
22. Id The majority responded to this point by noting that the section distinguishes between "the
Board" and a "group" on the Board. Two members can serve as a quorum of a group of three, but
cannot serve as a quorum of the Board. Id at 2640-41.
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intent that the Board continue to operate even under "suboptimal"
circumstances, like those presented by the twenty-six-month period in
which only two Board members were serving.23
As a case study in statutory interpretation, New Process Steel is a good
example of the failure of "neutral" interpretative methods to answer hard
questions.24 Both the majority and dissent laid claim to the most reasonable
interpretation of the plain language of the statute. Both agreed that the
language of section 3(b) is confusing at best. Both also drew heavily on
arguments about congressional intent. And both ultimately had to turn to
policy justifications outside of the statute to explain their decisions. The
majority focused on the trouble posed by a Board of only two members
exercising authority indefinitely. The dissenting Justices were more
concerned about the disruption that could be created by an interpretation
that calls into question the finality and precedential impact of hundreds of
NLRB decisions.25 As of now, however, the practical impact of the case
has not been so dramatic. All of the sixty-nine cases pending in the Courts
of Appeals at the time of the decision were remanded to the Board for
reconsideration, and the resulting delay is necessarily disruptive for parties
involved with those cases.2 6 In terms of developing precedent, however, the
Board today includes four members, and the decisions reached by the two-
member Board have, thus far, been upheld by the current Board.2 7
III. WHO DECIDES: JUDGE OR ARBITRATOR?
Arbitration got quite a bit of attention from the Court during the 2009
Term. The two arbitration disputes that arose in the context of the
workplace involved the division of responsibility between courts and
arbitrators for interpretation of arbitration agreements. In Granite Rock Co.
v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Court emphasized that
courts are responsible for determining the threshold question of whether
23. Id. at 2649 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
24. See Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of the Judiciary When the Agency Confirmation Process
Stalls: Thoughts on the Two-Member NLRB and the Questions the Supreme Court Should Have, But
Didn't, Address in New Process Steel LLC v. NLRB 6-9 (U.C. Irvine School of Law Research Paper No.
2010-22, 2010), available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1693979>.
25. See 130 S. Ct. at 2646 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
26. Press Release, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Supreme Court Rules Two-Member Board Lacked
Authority to Issue Decisions (June 17, 2010), available at <http://www.nlrb.gov/sharedfiles/
Press%20Releases/20 1 /R-2752.pdf>.
27. A Westlaw search conducted November 16, 2010 showed seventy-three decisions of the
NLRB issued since the Court's decision in New Process Steel in which an earlier Board decision was
reaffirmed "for the reasons stated" in the previous decision.
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and when the parties entered a contract.28 In Rent-a-Center v. Jackson,
however, a five Justice majority concluded that the parties to an arbitration
agreement may agree to submit to arbitral authority even matters - such as
unconscionability - that have traditionally been viewed as the province of
the courts.29 In a third arbitration decision that arose out of a commercial
dispute but will likely affect future employment agreements, the Court held
that an arbitration agreement that is silent as to whether it permits class
arbitration of claims cannot be interpreted to authorize classwide
arbitration.30 What all of these decisions share is an emphatic focus on
arbitration agreements as contracts and manifestation of party consent as a
central focus of inquiry.
A. Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Petitioner Granite Rock Company (Granite Rock) was a California
concrete and building materials company that employed about 800
people.31 Some of Granite Rock's employees were represented by
respondent International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 287 (the
Local).32 When the contract between Granite Rock and the Local expired at
the end of April 2004, the parties tried to negotiate a new collective
bargaining agreement. Their efforts hit an impasse and, on June 9, the
Local members initiated a strike in support of their contract demands. The
strike ended on July 2, when the parties reached agreement on a new
collective bargaining agreement.33 The new agreement contained a no-
strike clause, but it did not say anything specific about union members'
liability for any strike-related damages Granite Rock may have incurred
before the new collective bargaining agreement was negotiated but after the
prior collective bargaining agreement had expired.34
Contrary to advice from the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(the International or IBT), the Local did not demand a separate back-to-
work or hold harmless agreement with Granite Rock as a condition of
returning to work.35 After the Local's members voted to ratify the
collective bargaining agreement on July 2, the International advised the
28. 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2856-57 (2010).
29. 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010).
30. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); see also supra note 6.




35. Id. at 2854.
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Local not to honor its agreement o return to work on July 5 and instead to
continue the strike until Granite Rock agreed to hold the striking workers
harmless from liability for the June strike. Granite Rock informed the Local
that it would view a continuation of the strike to be a violation of the new
contract's no-strike clause, but JBT and the Local responded by announcing
a company-wide strike.36
On July 9, 2004, Granite Rock sued the International and the Local in
the district court, seeking an injunction against the ongoing strike and
asking for strike-related damages. Granite Rock argued that the Local
violated the collective bargaining agreement's no-strike provision with the
July 6 strike, and asked the district court to enjoin the strike because the
hold-harmless dispute giving rise to the strike was an arbitrable
grievance.37 The unions responded that the collective bargaining agreement
had not been validly ratified on July 2, and, thus, Granite Rock could not
raise claims under the no-strike clause.38
On August 22, while the parties were still debating the validity of the
July 2 ratification in court, the Local conducted a second ratification vote
on the collective bargaining agreement, and on September 13 the unions
called off their strike.39 Granite Rock, no longer seeking injunctive relief,
continued its suit for damages, amending its complaint to add a novel claim
against the International for tortious interference under § 301(a) of the
Labor Management Reporting Act (LMRA).4 0 While the suit was moving
through the court, in December, 2004, the parties executed the collective
bargaining agreement, making it retroactive to May 1, 2004.41
The International and the Local both moved to dismiss Granite Rock's
suit.4 2 The International argued that § 301(a) only supports a federal breach
of contract action and does not encompass the tort claim that Granite Rock
alleged. The Local's motion asked the court to send the dispute over the
collective bargaining agreement's ratification date to arbitration. The
district court dismissed Granite Rock's tortious interference claims, but
concluded that whether the agreement had been ratified on July 2 or August
22 was an issue for the court to decide.4 3 The question was submitted to a




39. Id. at 2854-2855.
40. Id at 2855.
41. Id at 2861, 2867.
42. Id. at 2851.
43. Id
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collective bargaining agreement on July 2, 2004. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Granite Rock's tortious
interference claims against IBT, but it reversed the district court on the
issue of whether the ratification date was a matter for judicial or arbitral
resolution.44 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on both questions.
The Court unanimously affirmed the Ninth Circuit's holding that the
LMRA does not encompass a federal common law claim for tortious
interference with contract.4 5 Granite Rock argued that adding a tortious
interference cause of action to the federal common law contract claims that
§ 301(a) permits would best serve the goals of "industrial peace and
economic stability."4 6 While the Court condemned the International's
alleged conduct, it observed that Granite Rock could have pursued
remedies under existing federal and state law, and thus expansion of federal
common law remedies was unnecessary and unwise.47
The question of whether the ratification date was a matter for decision
by the court or by an arbitrator occupied most of the Court's decision.
Justice Thomas wrote for a seven Justice majority that, on the facts of this
dispute, the question was one for the courts. The majority opinion
emphasized what i described as "the first principle that underscores all of
our arbitration decisions: Arbitration is strictly 'a matter of consent."'4 8 In
the majority's analysis, the question of when the collective bargaining
agreement was ratified was intimately tied to whether the parties had in fact
consented to arbitrate the applicability of the no-strike provisions. Having
reached that conclusion, the majority dismissed arguments by the
International and the Local that emphasized the federal policies favoring
arbitration of labor disputes and the Court's prior statements that "'any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor
of arbitration."'49
The majority noted that all parties agreed that the arbitration clause
only covered disputes that "arose under" the agreement. Accordingly, the
ratification date dispute was only arbitrable if it could be characterized as
"arising under" the collective bargaining agreement. Whether the dispute
"arises under" the agreement depends on whether the agreement was in
44. 546 F.3d 1169, 1170-78 (2008).
45. Granite Rock, 130 S. Ct. at 2866.
46. Id. at 2864.
47. Id. at 2864-65.
48. Id. at 2857 (quoting Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 479 (1989)).
49. Id. at 2857 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)).
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force at the time - in other words, depends on the ratification date. Because
determination of the ratification date was, in its view, a necessary precursor
to resolving whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the no-strike claim, the
Court concluded that it was an issue properly resolved by a court rather
than an arbitrator.so
The majority refused to consider the Local's argument that the
December 2004 agreement reached by the parties rendered the collective
bargaining agreement effective as of May 1, 2004 (the date the prior
agreement expired) and thus answered the timing question on which the
Court focused its attention. The majority concluded that because the court
of appeals had not ruled on the merits of this argument, and it was not
raised in the Local's opposition to Granite Rock's petition for certiorari,
"the argument is properly 'deemed waived."'5 l
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented from the
Court's conclusion about whether it was for a court or an arbitrator to
decide the formation date of the collective bargaining agreement.5 2 In the
dissenters' view, the parties clearly agreed in the new contract to have an
arbitrator decide this issue. Because the agreement executed by the parties
in December of 2004 made the new contract effective retroactive to May 1,
2004, the agreement was effective when the Local went on strike in July,
and its arbitration clause was thus operative at that date.53 Consequently,
concluded the dissent, the dispute between the Local and Granite Rock
about when the contract was ratified was one that arose under the contract
and should be decided by the arbitrator. On this view, what was important
was that the dispute over the ratification date arose after the collective
bargaining agreement's effective date of May 1, 2004.54 The ratification
date was not a formation dispute subject to judicial resolution; it was
simply a defense that went to the merits of whether the Local was
privileged to go on strike at a time when it arguably had not ratified the
contract. That defense was part of the grievance for the arbitrator.ss
As to the Court's position that this retroactive effectiveness argument
had been waived, the dissenters agreed that it was "regrettable" that the
factual point had not previously been raised, but argued that it could not
simply be ignored.5 6 The entire case, observed the dissent, turned on the
50. Id. at 2860-61.
51. Id. at 2861 (citing SUP. CT. R. 15.2).
52. Id. at 2866 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 2867 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
54. Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
55. Id at 2868 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2868-69 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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premise that the parties disputed the existence of a binding contract at a
particular point in time.
Because it is instead undisputed that the parties executed a binding
contract in December 2004 that was effective as of May 2004, we can
scarcely pretend that the parties have a formation dispute. Consideration
of this fact is "a 'predicate to an intelligent resolution' of the question
presented, and therefore 'fairly included therein."'57
B. Rent-a-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson
While Granite Rock emphasized that questions about the formation of
an arbitration agreement ordinarily should be resolved by courts rather than
arbitrators, the five Justice majority in Rent-a-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson
held that the question of whether an arbitration agreement was
"unconscionable" - ordinarily one that would fall within a judge's
interpretive ambit - could be assigned by contract to an arbitrator.
The case arose out of an employment discrimination suit filed in
federal court by Antonio Jackson, a former employee at Rent-a-Center
(RAC). Jackson's employment contract with RAC contained an arbitration
clause requiring arbitration of all disputes, including discrimination claims,
and stating that
[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal, state, or local court or agency, shall
have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the
interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation of this
Agreement, including, but not limited to any claim that all of any part of
this Agreement is void or voidable.59
RAC moved under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to dismiss or stay the
district court proceedings and compel arbitration in light of this provision.60
When Jackson opposed the motion, arguing that the arbitration agreement
was unenforceable because it was unconscionable, RAC responded that the
court could not consider the unconscionability claim because the agreement
assigned even that threshold evaluation to the arbitrator.61 The district court
granted RAC's motion, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed,
concluding that "where 'a party challenges an arbitration agreement as
unconscionable, and thus asserts that he could not meaningfully assent to
the agreement, the threshold question of unconscionability is for the
57. Id. (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (quoting Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S.
252, 258, n.5 (1980)).
58. 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010).
59. Id. at 2779.
60. Id.; see 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (2006).
61. Rent-a-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2779.
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court."' 62
The Court's opinion, written by Justice Scalia, began by observing
that the FAA "places arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other
contracts," meaning that they are subject to the same basic contract law
principles as other types of contracts.6 3 The FAA also establishes
procedures that define the relationship and division of authority between
federal courts and arbitrators. In particular, the Court's opinion noted, the
FAA requires courts to order arbitration "upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith
is not in issue."6 4 This means that courts typically address threshold
questions about formation of the arbitration agreement. If, however, the
parties choose to assign those threshold questions to the arbitrator, nothing
in the FAA prohibits that contractual choice.
The Court moved from those basic statements of the applicable law to
a description of the agreement entered by Jackson and RAC.. The majority
described the agreement as including two relevant provisions: one, a
provision defining the claims covered by the agreement o arbitrate and the
second, a provision delegating resolution of covered claims to an
arbitrator.65 In seeking to compel arbitration, the Court explained, RAC
was asking the courts to enforce the second provision.66 And the courts
must enforce that delegation provision, the Court continued, because
Jackson's challenge was to the first provisison; he never specifically
challenged the delegation provision of the agreement.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority took a path of reasoning that
was not argued by either party in briefs or at argument before the Court.
Rather than considering what showing would be necessary to demonstrate
intent to subject threshold questions to arbitration, which is the question the
parties had focused on,67 the Court expanded on a line of cases about the
severability of arbitration provisions.68
It is a well-settled principle, the majority noted, that "'an arbitration
provision is severable from the remainder of the contract."'6 9 Moreover, the
62. Id. at 2776 (quoting Jackson v. Rent-a-Center West, Inc., 581 F.3d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 2009)).
63. Id
64. Id
65. Id at 2778.
66. Id. at 2779.
67. See text accompanying notes 74-77 infra (discussing the dissenting opinion).
68. See Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges,
available at <http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmn?abstractid=1552966>.
69. Rent-a-Center 130 S.Ct. at 2778 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S.
440, 445 (2006)).
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Court observed, neither party had asked the Court to disrupt a line of cases
holding that, under the FAA, a challenge to the enforceability of an
agreement to arbitrate is distinct from a challenge to the enforceability of a
contract containing an arbitration agreement.70 These prior cases had
involved contracts that were on the whole unrelated to arbitration but that
included arbitration agreements within them, while in this dispute the
entire contract being challenged was itself an arbitration agreement.71 But
the Court construed the "delegation clause" assigning the arbitrator
responsibility for determining the threshold question of enforceability as
"an additional, antecedent agreement."72 Jackson's challenge had been to
the entire arbitration agreement, not to that separate delegation clause.
Therefore, the majority concluded, delegation to the arbitrator of the
decision about the contract's enforceability had never really been
challenged and so had to be accepted as valid under the FAA.73
Justice Stevens' angry dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor, criticized the majority for adopting an "infinite severability
rule" that was not urged by either party nor compelled by precedent.74 The
dissent agreed with the majority opinion that the threshold question of
arbitrability may be assigned to an arbitrator in certain circumstances. One
such circumstance is when the parties' intent to assign the determination of
arbitrability to the arbitrator is "clear and unmistakable."75 In this case, the
dissent argued, that standard was not met. "Respondent's claim that the
arbitration agreement is unconscionable undermines any suggestion that he
.clearly' and 'unmistakably' assented to submit questions of arbitrability to
the arbitrator."76 This is how the case should have been resolved, Justice
Stevens argued. The majority chose instead to interpret "the delegation
clause as a distinct mini-arbitration agreement divisible from the contract in
which it resides" and then to conclude that Jackson's challenge to the entire
arbitration agreement was not sufficient to constitute a challenge to the
"particular sentences" constituting the delegation provision.77
Jackson is a hard case to place into any broader context. It certainly
may open the door for employers to insist that even threshold matters such
70. Id
71. Id. at 2779.
72. Id. at 2777-78.
73. Id at 2779-81. The Court declined to consider the arguments that Jackson made in his merits
briefs about the unconscionability of the delegation provision because the challenge was brought "too
late." Id at 2781.
74. Id. at 2781, 2787-88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2783.
76. Id. at 2784.
77. Id. at 2787.
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as unconscionability must always be delegated to arbitration. But the
decision itself did not actually suggest that this would always be
permissible. Indeed, if Jackson had challenged the right sentences in the
contract, his challenge might have been successful. What the decision does
seem to do is to both emphasize the parties' intent in the formation of the
contract while frankly ignoring the employee's intent through its
hypertechnical litigation rule that plainly thwarted Jackson's intent.
Future parties can avoid Jackson's specific mistake, but the Court's
refusal in both Rent-a-Center and Granite Rock to consider on the merits
the arguments put forward by the employees reflects an approach that is
much harder to avoid.
IV. EXPLORING ERISA
The Court dealt with two very different issues under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)78 during the 2009 Term.
One involved a very straightforward question of statutory interpretation
about appropriate circumstances for the award of attorney's fees in an
ERISA dispute.7 9 The other was a more controversial ruling that a benefits
plan administrator who has incorrectly interpreted the plan is nonetheless
entitled to deference in its follow-on interpretation of the same terms.so
A. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.
Section 1132(g) of ERISA provides that "a reasonable attorney's fee
and costs" are available "to either party" at the court's "discretion."8 ' In
Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., the Court held that this
provision gives a district court discretion to award fees so long as "the fee
claimant has achieved 'some degree of success on the merits."' 82
Petitioner Bridget Hardt was an executive assistant at textile
manufacturer Dan River, Inc.83 She was diagnosed with carpal tunnel
syndrome, and when surgeries on her wrists failed to alleviate her neck and
shoulder pain, Hardt stopped working in January 2003. In August of that
year, Hardt applied for long-term disability benefits. Respondent Reliance
Standard Life Insurance Company (Reliance) had authority for determining
78. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at scattered sections of titles 26
and 29 U.S.C. (2006)).
79. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149 (2010).
80. Conkright v. Fronmert, 130 S. Ct. 1640 (2010).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2006).
82. Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2152 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694 (1983)).
83. Id.
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whether a claimant employed by Dan River qualified for benefits. Reliance
ultimately concluded that Hardt was disabled from her regular work
(though not necessarily from all work) and that she was entitled to
temporary disability benefits for twenty-four months.84
Over the course of that twenty-four months, Hardt's symptoms
worsened and expanded, and one of her doctors diagnosed her with a
progressively worsening small-fiber neuropathy.85 Despite her worsening
condition, and a decision by the Social Security Administration to award
Hardt disability benefits, Reliance notified her that her plan benefits would
expire at the end of the twenty-four-month period because they did not
consider her "totally disabled from all occupations."86
Hardt filed an administrative appeal. She gave Reliance all of her
medical records, the information she had provided the Social Security
Administration when they assessed her disability status, and an updated
questionnaire from one of her physicians. Reliance asked Hardt to
supplement this material with a "functional capacities" evaluation that it
would use to assess what jobs she could or could not perform. Reliance did
not ask the evaluator it hired to review Hardt for neuropathic pain, even
though the company was aware of her neuropathy diagnosis. Because the
evaluators were not aware of Hardt's neuropathy, they concluded that her
efforts on the functional capacity evaluations were "submaximal" and that
the evaluations were invalid. 8
Reliance next hired a physician and a vocational rehabilitation
counselor to assist in its determination of whether Hardt was entitled to
benefits. The physician, instead of examining Hardt, reviewed some - but
not all - of her medical records.89 He concluded she should expect her
health to improve. The vocational counselor performed a labor market
study based on the state of Hardt's health two years earlier, and found eight
suitable employment opportunities. Based on this information, Reliance
concluded that its decision to terminate Hardt's benefits was correct.90
After exhausting her administrative remedies, Hardt filed suit against
Reliance, alleging that the company had violated ERISA by wrongfully
denying her claim for long-term disability benefits.91 The parties filed
84. Id.






91. Id at 2153-54.
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cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court denied both.
The district court first rejected Reliance's request for summary
judgment affirming the denial of benefits, finding that Reliance had based
its decision on incomplete, vague, contradictory, and conclusory
information and that the company had improperly ignored evidence that
Hardt presented in support of her case.92 The court also denied Hardt's
motion for summary judgment, which argued that Reliance's denial of
benefits was unreasonable as a matter of law. The court said that it was
"inclined to rule in Ms. Hardt's favor," but that it was going to give
Reliance a chance to fix the problem itself initially. 93 If Reliance did not
consider all of the evidence in support of Hardt's application within thirty
days and reevaluate its decision, the court explained, it would then issue
judgment in her favor. After conducting the review the court required,
Reliance found that Hardt was eligible for long-term disability benefits.
The company also paid her $55,250 in accrued, past-due benefits.94
At that point, Hardt asked the court for attorney's fees and costs under
§ 1132(g)(1), which provides that "the court in its discretion may allow a
reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party."95 Applying
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of that provision, the district court
focused its inquiry initially on whether Hardt was a "prevailing party" in
the dispute. The court concluded that she had prevailed and ultimately
awarded fees.96 The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding that Hardt did not
meet the definition of a "prevailing party."97 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve 1) whether § 1132(g) requires a party to have prevailed
for an award of fees and 2) what the appropriate standards for fee-shifting
under § 1132(g) should be.
The Court observed that federal statutes that include fee-shifting
provisions that deviate from the "American Rule" requiring each party to
pay its own attorney's fees take several forms.98 Some permit awards of
fees only to a "prevailing party."99 Others will shift fees to a "successful"
litigant or a "substantially prevailing party." 00 And some, like ERISA's §
92. Id. at 2154.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)).
96. Id. at 2154-55.
97. Id. at 2155.
98. Id. at 2156-57.
99. See, e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Resources,
532 U.S. 598, 601-03 (2001) (citing examples); Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684, n.3
(1983) (same).
100. Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2157 & nn.4-5 (citing cases).
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1132(g)(1), provide the district court with discretion about fee awards.101
Given this variety of fee-shifting statutes, the Court concluded, the lower
courts had erred in importing a "prevailing party" requirement into §
1 132(g)(1). The words "prevailing party" do not appear in § 1 132(g)(1) and
there is nothing else in the text to suggest such a limitation. In fact, the text
of the section suggests just the opposite; § 1132(g)(1) gives district courts
"discretion" to award attorney's fees "to either party."l 02
The Court went on to caution that the discretion thus given to the
district courts was not unbounded. Instead, courts should assume that
Congress meant to abide by "'historic fee-shifting principles and intuitive
notions of fairness."'0 3 These notions of fairness are satisfied "if the court
can fairly call the outcome of the litigation some success on the merits."04
Given the facts of this case, the Court concluded, it was quite reasonable
for the court to exercise its discretion to award attorney's fees to Hardt.0 5
B. Conkright v. Frommert
Under longstanding precedent, an ERISA plan administrator who is
given discretion to interpret a plan's terms is entitled to deference in the
exercise of that discretion.106 In Conkright v. Frommert a divided Court
held that an administrator's "single honest mistake" in interpreting an
ERISA pension plan does not justify withholding deference for subsequent
related interpretations of the plan.107
The case involved allegations by a group of Xerox employees that the
company's pension plan and its administrators violated ERISA when they
determined how to account for past distributions in calculating the
employees' current benefits.'08 These employees had left Xerox in the
1980s and received lump-sum distributions of retirement benefits they had
earned until then. They were subsequently rehired, and the plan
administrator interpreted the plan to require a benefit-calculation method
that reduced the employees' present benefits by the amount that the
101. Id. at 2157-58 & n.7 (citing examples); see 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(1).
102. Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2156; see 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(1).
103. Hardt, 130 S. Ct. at 2158 (quoting Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 686).
104. Id
105. Id. at 2159. Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurrence to note that he maintained his
disagreement with the Court's interpretation of the Clean Air Act in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680 (1983), and would not rest the conclusion in this case on any reliance on that interpretation of
a different statute. Instead, he would focus on the language of § 1132(g)(1) and the facts that led the
district court to exercise appropriate discretion in this instance. Id (Stevens, J., concurring).
106. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109-11 (1989).
107. 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1644 (2010).
108. Id at 1645.
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previously paid-out benefits would theoretically have attained if the money
had remained in the company's investment fund.1 09 The employees
challenged that approach to calculating their benefits and sued the plan
administrator under ERISA. 0
The district court found for the administrator, but the Second Circuit
reversed, holding that the interpretation was unreasonable and that the
employees had received inadequate notice of the method to be used."' On
remand, the plan administrator proposed a new approach. This one
calculated the current value of the past distribution using an interest rate
fixed at the time the distribution had been made."2 The plan administrator
argued that the district court should accord this interpretation deference and
accept it as reasonable. The district court disagreed. Concluding that the
plan was ambiguous, the district court refused to give deference to the
administrator the second time around, and instead adopted the
interpretation of the plan proposed by the employees.113 The Second Circuit
affirmed, noting particularly that "a court need not apply a deferential
standard 'where the administrator ha[s] previously construed the same
[plan] terms and we found such a construction to have violated ERISA."' l
4
The Supreme Court reversed in a five to three decision authored by
Chief Justice Roberts."' Continuing his famous affinity for baseball
terminology, the Chief Justice criticized the standard applied by the lower
courts as a "'one-strike-and-you're-out' approach.""6 The majority
concluded instead that the plan administrator's original mistake did not
justify eliminating or reducing the deference owed to that administrator by
a reviewing court."'7 Looking to the trust law principles that traditionally
guide interpretation of ERISA plans, the majority concluded that they were
"unclear on the narrow question before us.""' In light of that lack of
clarity, the majority found that the rule of deference to plan administrators






114. Id. at 1646 (quoting Frommert v. Conkright, 535 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2008)).
115. Id. at 1644. Justice Sotomayor did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
Id. at 1652.
116. Id at 1646.
117. Id. at 1651-52. For the standard the Court wished to apply, see Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.v.
Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
118. Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1647.
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involved in this dispute could not create an exception to it.119 If there had
been evidence of bad faith, the majority noted, that would have been a
different case.120 Here, though, the benefits of efficiency and uniformity in
the administration of benefit plans that flow from deference to plan
administrators outweigh any concern about unreasonable plan
interpretations.121
Justice Breyer dissented, in an opinion joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg. The dissenters looked to governing trust principles and
concluded that in fact trust law forbids continued deference to an
administrator who has already been found to have abused his or her
discretion.122 Justice Breyer criticized the majority's reliance on the
honesty of the administrator's mistake, arguing that it will unnecessarily
complicate judicial review by requiring courts to make a determination of
whether a mistake was "honest" or not. 123
The opinions in Conkright split along ideological lines, and also
differed quite profoundly in their descriptions of the factual background to
the case. Chief Justice Roberts focused on the "honesty" of the plan
administrator and expressed outrage at the plan interpretation proposed by
the employees and adopted by the lower courts, describing the
interpretation as actuarial "heresy." 24 The dissent, by contrast, focused on
the lack of notice to employees about the accounting method chosen by the
plan administrator and described the consequences for affected employees
of applying the interpretation first adopted by the plan administrator -
consequences that could have meant a difference in pension payout of
thousands of dollars annually.125 Whether the decision will have significant
consequences for other pension plan administrators or beneficiaries will be,
as Conkright itself proved to be, a very fact-specific question.
V. TIMELINESS IN DISPARATE IMPACT CHALLENGES
Justice Antonin Scalia authored the opinion for a unanimous Court in
the only employment discrimination case of the Term. Lewis v. City of
Chicago presented the Court with the question of when the clock starts
running for a plaintiff bringing a Title VII disparate impact challenge to an
119. Id. at 1647-49.
120. Id. at 1648.
121. Id. at 1649-50.
122. Id at 1655-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
123. Id at 1659 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1650.
125. Id at 1652-53, app. at 1661-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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employer's use of an exam cut-off score to draw multiple successive
applicant pools. 12 6
In July 1995, over 26,000 applicants took a written examination that
was part of the process for applying to serve in the Chicago Fire
Department.12 7 The City scored the exams and announced in January, 1996
that it would begin drawing randomly for further interviews from among
those "well-qualified" applicants who scored between eighty-nine and one
hundred on the written test. Those applicants who scored below sixty-five
on the test received a rejection letter at that same time. For the applicants
whose scores fell between sixty-five and eighty-eight, he City notified
them that they had been deemed "qualified" for further interviewing and
would remain on the eligibility list, but that, based on projected hiring
needs, it was unlikely they would ever be called.12 8
Over the course of the next six years, the City selected groups of
applicants from the eligibility list, each time but the last filling its pool of
interviews with applicants from the "well-qualified" group. During the
final selection, a number of applicants who had scored in the "qualified"
range were added to the interview pool.12 9
On March 31, 1997, Crawford Smith, an African-American who
scored in the "qualified" range and had not been selected for further
interviews, filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC challenging the
City's cut-off scores.130 In July 1998, the EEOC issued right-to-sue letters
to Crawford and five other "qualified" applicants, and two months later, the
group filed a class action suit against the City. The suit alleged that the
City's practice of selecting for advancement through t e interview process
only applicants who scored eighty-nine or above had a discriminatory
disparate impact on African-Americans in violation of Title VII.1 3 1
The City sought summary judgment on the ground that petitioners had
not filed EEOC charges within 300 days after their claims accrued. The
City argued that the only practice that had caused any disparate impact was
the practice of dividing the applicants into "qualified," "well-qualified" and
"not-qualified" categories. Since that had occurred in January 1996, and
EEOC charges had not been filed until more than a year later, the plaintiffs'
claims were time-barred, according to the City.132
126. 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2195 (2010).
127. Id at 2195.
128. Id at 2195-96.
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The district court denied the motion, applying a "continuing violation"
theory because of what it called the City's "ongoing reliance" on the 1995
test results.133 In the court's view, the January 1996 sorting and the
selection of interviewees was part of a single, ongoing practice, all of
which fell within the time for challenge. The case went to a bench trial,
with the City stipulating that using the cut-off of eighty-nine had a
significant disparate impact, but arguing that it was justified by business
necessity. The district court ruled for the petitioners. The Seventh Circuit
reversed, agreeing with the City that the suit was time-barred.13 4
The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia
explained that both the district court and the court of appeals had analyzed
the problem incorrectly. Under the disparate impact provisions of Title VII,
added to the statute by Congress in 1991, "a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie disparate-impact claim by showing that the employer 'uses a
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact' on one of
the prohibited bases."'35 Applying that language to the facts presented, the
Court concluded that "the exclusion of passing applicants who scored
below 89 (until the supply of scores 89 or above was exhausted) when
selecting those who would advance" was an "employment practice" and
that the City "use[d]" that practice each time it selected a new group of
candidates to proceed further in the process.136
The Court rejected the City's argument that the only possible violation
of Title VII occurred in the initial 1996 ranking of the test-takers. The City
was mistaken in relying on a line of disparate treatment cases that had
barred claims as untimely when those claims focused on the present effects
of prior discriminatory acts.3 ' The difference here, reasoned the Court, was
that those cases failed because the plaintiffs could not show present or
recent discriminatory intent, and disparate treatment cases require intent to
be shown within the limitations period.3 8 In a disparate impact case, where
intent to discriminate is not an element of the claim, all that a plaintiff need
show is that the challenge practice was "used" within the relevant time
period. In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the City's argument
that the rule announced in Lewis would leave employment practices open to
indefinite challenge. The alternate rule, noted Justice Scalia, would mean
133. Id.
134. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 528 F.3d 488, 491 (2008).
135. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2006)).
136. Id. at 2198-99.
137. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); Lorance v. AT & T
Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
138. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2199.
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that an employment practice with a disparate impact would be permanently
insulated from challenge 300 days after its first use. Neither outcome, he
noted, makes perfect sense.3 9
The decision in Lewis was most surprising because its author, Justice
Scalia, had less than a year earlier raised questions about the
constitutionality of Title VII's disparate impact provisions.14 0 To the extent
that this opinion altered the operation of disparate impact law at all, it
might have opened the door for a slightly higher number of impact cases by
establishing a standard for timeliness that is more expansive than that
applied to disparate treatment claims.
VI. EMPLOYEE PRIVACY AND WORKPLACE TECHNOLOGY
A unanimous Court concluded in City of Ontario v. Quon, that a
governmental employer had not violated the Fourth Amendment's ban on
unreasonable searches and seizures when it read personal text messages
sent to and from a pager owned by the employer and issued to an
employee.141 While noting that "the case touches issues of far-reaching
significance," the opinion avoided settling the contours of government
employees' privacy expectations in new technology.14 2
The police department of the City of Ontario, California had a written
computer policy providing that the City could monitor employees' email
and internet use without giving notice to the employees.14 3 The policy had
been in place for some time when the City issued its employees - including
Jeff Quon, a sergeant and SWAT team member - pagers that could send
and receive text messages. The computer policy did not specifically include
text messaging in its coverage, but the City did advise its employees that it
would treat text messages that same way it treated emails.144
The City gave its SWAT team members these pagers so that they
could communicate and respond to emergencies more efficiently.14 5 It was
clear, however, that the City understood that employees might use the
pagers for some personal communication. Ontario paid a flat rate for a
certain monthly allotment of characters sent on the pager and overages
beyond those allotments resulted in fees. For a time, the City permitted
139. Id. at 2200.
140. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010).
142. Id.
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employees themselves to pay the fees associated with any overages they
accrued.14 6 After some time, however, the supervisors collecting the
overage fees balked at the responsibility, and the City decided to audit the
texts being sent to determine whether they were or were not work-related
and whether the city would need to increase the monthly allotment in its
contract.14 7 This audit revealed that many of the texts Quon sent were not
work-related and that some were sexually explicit. Further investigation
showed that he majority of the messages Quon sent during work time were
not work-related. 148
Quon, together with other officers affected by the investigation, filed
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that the City's decision to read his
text messages was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.14 9 The district court concluded that Quon had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages and held a jury trial
on the question of whether the City's purpose for the audit was reasonable.
The jury concluded that it was, and the district court dismissed the
claims.150 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the search was
unreasonable because the same purpose could have been served by less
intrusive means."'
Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court reviewed the unsettled state
of the Supreme Court's precedent on the privacy expectations of
government employees and concluded that this case did not require the
Court to resolve any uncertainty in the field. In what Justice Scalia's harsh
concurrence described as an "excursus" and a "digression,"1 52 the opinion
went on to observe that rapidly evolving technology makes it difficult to
pin down the precise contours of a reasonable privacy expectation and to
opine that society's expectations about privacy will likely evolve as
technology evolves.15 3 In part because of these evolving ideas, the Court
resolved the question presented in this case by assuming, without deciding,
146. Id.
147. Id. at 2626.
148. Id
149. Id. The plaintiffs also sued the company that had provided the pagers and had responded to the
City's request for transcripts of Quon's texts, arguing that the company had violated the Stored
Communications Act. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on the questions raised by that aspect of the
litigation. Id at 2626-27.
150. Id.
151. Id at 2627.
152. Id at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Stevens also wrote separately to "highlight" that the
Court's decision did not resolve the best way to evaluate the reasonableness of an employee's privacy
expectations. Id. at 2633-34 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Id at 2627-30.
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both that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy and that reviewing
text messages was in fact a search. The Court then concluded that the
search conducted by the City was reasonable in any event.154
The Court found that the search had been legitimately justified when it
began because the City's "non-investigatory, work-related purpose" of
determining whether its monthly contract with the text provider was
appropriate to ensure that employees weren't paying for work-related use
and the City wasn't paying an exorbitant amount for personal use that
resulted in overage fees.15 5 Given this reasonable goal, the Court
concluded, the scope of the City's search was not overly intrusive. The
Court firmly rejected the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the City was
required to conduct the "least intrusive" search possible. 15 6
VII. CONCLUSION
The collection of labor and employment cases the Court considered
during the 2009 Term seems unlikely to significantly change either work
life or work law. The statutory interpretation cases, with the exception of
New Process Steel, were unanimous and involved relatively limited
provisions of their respective statutes. New Process Steel presented a much
more controversial decision, but not one whose application will reach
beyond the specific question the case presented. In several cases that
involved allocation of decisionmaking authority - whether between courts
and arbitrators or between courts and pension plan administrators - the
Court emphasized the priority of efficient private ordering over expansive
judicial review.
During this relatively quiet employment Term, the Court itself
underwent historic personnel change. Justice Sonya Sotomayor sat for her
first Term. And at the end of the Term, Justice Elena Kagan took the seat of
retiring Justice John Paul Stevens. Moreover, the Court granted certiorari n
several very important employment discrimination cases, including what
may be the most important employment case the Court has taken or will
take in decades, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.157
154. Id. at 2630-32.
155. Id. at 2631.
156. Id. at 2632.
157. No. 10-277, 2010 WL 3358931 (Dec. 6, 2010).
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